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The history of the parliamentary lobby, the phrase generally used to designate those 
political journalists with unique and privileged access to governmental sources, is one in 
which there are notable commonalities between the practices in Britain and Ireland.  
Indeed, the lobby owes its very existence to the political tension between the two islands 
in the 1880's, when the Fenian propensity for bombing prominent British targets, notably 
the Palace of Westminster, led the authorities there to restrict access by journalists and 
others to the precincts of the houses of parliament.  Since 1884, in effect, this restricted 
list has been kept, and controlled, by the Speaker of the House of Commons (Michael 
Foley, “The Political Lobby System”, Irish Communications Review, 3, 1993, p. 23). 
Britain passed its first Official Secrets Act five years after the establishment of the first,  
rudimentary lobby, a successful example of closing the stable door before the horse has 
even thought of escaping. 
            
The lobby, however, is effectively a list within a list.   In Britain, it is comprised of a self-
perpetuating elite with written rules, whose members accord government ministers and 
spokespersons anonymity in return for privileged access to political information.  It is 
less a marriage of equals than, in the words of a distinguished political commentator, the 
creation of a new group of insiders "to.....exclude the public and the mass of writers of 
countless newsletters, pamphlet sheets and weeklies who had overcrowded the members' 
lobby" (James Margach, Abuse of Power, London, Transatlantic, 1978, 125).  The same 
writer clearly identifies, without resolving, the central dilemma in any such arrangement:  
"Both government and the media are compelled by the unlimited demands of modern 
communications to co-operate, yet by all basic tests they are opposing and rival forces" 
(James Margach, Anatomy of Power, London, Star Books, 1981, p. 129). 
 
There have been two basic theses relevant to the lobby system in Ireland.  The first, major 
thesis (Peter Kellner, ‘The Lobby, Official Secrets and Good Government’, 
Parliamentary Affairs 36,3,  1983, 275-82), is that this is a system for subverting 
important press freedoms, for facilitating the manipulation of information and of the 
media themselves by government, and has important negative consequences for the 
quality of democracy in those societies of which it is a feature.  The minor thesis (Foley, 
‘Lobby’, 21-31), suggests that the Irish and UK systems are analagous, and that the 
defects of one are mirrored in the other.  Another commentator, Brian Farrell, argues that 
the Irish system, which he sees as operating on a broadly similar basis, "creates a much 
more secretive form of Cabinet-media relationship, frequently characterised by leaks, 
often inspired and manipulated" (Brian Farrell, ‘Cabinet-Media Relationships: 
approaches to a comparitive typology’, UCD seminar paper, 1969, cited in Foley, 
‘Lobby’, 29).  Foley, while arguing that "there are strong similarities in both systems" 
suggests that "similarities in structures and organisation could possibly hide a system 
which allows a greater independent inquiry, while maintaining elements of the British 
lobby terms" (Foley, ‘Lobby’, 29). 
 
This paper is based to some extent on a number of participant interviews with a number 
of political writers, many of them at one time - or still - members of the lobby, such as 
Dick Walsh, Bruce Arnold, Michael Mills, Ted Nealon and Sean Duignan. Although it is 
not necessary to ascribe particular views to particular individuals,  the evidence they 
provide about the workings of the system suggests that both the major and minor theses 
may not hold entirely true for Ireland, or at least that the historical development of the 
lobby system in Ireland has diverged from that in Westminster, with important 
consequences both for journalists and politicians. 
 
One way of examining the similarities and differences between the palace of Westminster 
and Leinster House lobby systems - is to look at the differing ways in which they have 
evolved and have responded to particular issues, tensions, and strains within government-
media relationships. 
 
Viewed in this context, the Westminster model has remained remarkably static.  The 
creation of the lobby in 1884 was a first merely organisational:  it developed an important 
professional dimension under Ramsay MacDonald, who appointed Britain's first 
government press secretary (although he was not described as such), George Seward.  
This, according to Margach, was when "the old style competitive outsiders were 
organised into a fraternity of organised insiders" (Margach, Anatomy, 137). 
 
It was a century after the informal creation of the lobby system that it received its first 
serious shock (it had, of course, grown in size along the way, but without any 
accompanying function).  This was in 1986, when Margaret Thatcher was British Prime 
Minister and Bernard Ingham her press secretary.  In that year, the newly-founded 
London Independent decided that it would have no part of the lobby system.  The 
Guardian, possibly somewhat upstaged on this matter of principle, decided that although 
it would continue to attend lobby briefings, it would henceforth refer to "a Downing 
Street spokesman" or "Mrs Thatcher's spokesman" as the source for its information.  
Acceptance of this practice by the lobby would have meant a change in its rule-book, 
which specified that all information was non-attributable.  After a lengthy internal debate, 
the lobby decided to maintain its rules, and the Guardian left (Robert Harris, Good and 
Faithful Servant: The Unauthorized Biography of Bernard Ingham, London, Faber, 1988, 
154-5) .  It was hardly a crisis, but certainly an embarrassment, and was not resolved until 
both Mrs Thatcher and Mr Ingham had departed, when a new regime offered both 
newspapers the opportunity to opt back in, encouraged by a compromise formula which 
allowed for minimal attribution. 
 
Since then, controversy about the lobby and its functions has been remarkable by its 
absence.  David Walker's derisive description of it as "a crutch for crippled journalists" 
(M. Cockerell, P. Hennessy and D. Walker, Sources Close to the Prime Minister, 
Macmillan, London, 1984, cited in Foley ‘Lobby’, 29), like the handful of other 
criticisms that have been made of the system from time to time, has been greeted by a 
somewhat costive silence. 
 
The development of the lobby in Ireland has been in some respects slower, in others more 
organic and healthy.  It was slower because the initial relationships between government 
and media in Ireland were characterised, if not necessarily by hostility, certainly by 
coolness.  In spite of the fact that most Irish national newspapers in 1922 supported the 
Free State government, their bad behaviour in insisting on reporting the civil war from a 
journalistic, rather than a political standpoint engendered considerable mistrust in 
Merrion Street (John Horgan, ‘State Policy and the Press’, The Crane Bag X XX XXX-
XXX) ). 
 
Nor did the change in government in 1932 make things much better.  The de Valera 
administration was viewed with a baleful eye by both The Irish Times and the Irish 
Independent, in a context in which the support given to him by the Irish Press was seen as 
an exercise in politics rather than an exercise in journalism. 
 
The beginnings of a lobby system were created during the war by Sean Lemass, the long-
time Minister for Industry and Commerce, who held regular briefings on the supply 
situation with senior journalists (John Horgan, Sean Lemass: The Enigmatic Patriot, 
Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1987, 107).  It grew in influence after the war was over, and 
became more formalised.  There was at this stage relatively little specialisation;  at least 
the current division between parliamentary journalists and political journalists was not so 
pronounced.  The umbrella organisation for all such journalists at that time was the 
Parliamentary Press Gallery (which currently has as members only those journalists who 
report the actual proceedings of the Dail and some parliamentary sketch writers).  This 
was the organisation which helped to put the final nails into the coffin of the Irish News 
Agency, which had been founded by Sean MacBride in 1949 and which staggered on, 
weakened by attacks from within and without, until it received the coup de grace in 1957.  
There is no doubt, reading the files, that opposition to the INA by a powerful and well-
organised group of Irish political journalists within the lobby was a major factor in its 
demise.  The alacrity with which Mr de Valera jumped to pay attention to the wishes of 
the people who were virtually the sole conduits to the public of the proceedings of the 
Oireachtas and the pronouncements of governmental ministers was transparent (John 
Horgan, ‘Government, Propaganda and the Irish News Agency’, Irish Communications 
Review 3 (1993), 31-43). 
 
It is not possible to identify the point at which the lobby, as such, came formally into 
existence, but it is certainly possible to speak of phases in the relationship between 
government and media which is generally characterised by this term.  The likelihood is 
that the lobby began to exist on a formal or sem-formal basis at some stage in the early 
1950s, and retained its basic shape unchanged for about two decades.  The emergence of 
this status quo was facilitated by continuity on both sides.  On the government side, the 
watchful presence, either as head of the Government Information Bureau or as assistant 
secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach, of Padraig O hAnnrachain, ensured that all 
potentially contentious matters were being dealt with by a safe pair of hands.  The 
measure of this continuity can be gauged from the fact that O hAnnrachain acted in his 
capacity not only for de Valera, but also for Lemass and Lynch.  He continued to act for 
Haughey but in a somewhat different role. 
 
On the media side, the turnover was low, and it was even some time before the position 
of political correspondent, even on a national newspaper, became a full-time one:  
journalists who wrote about politics were often expected to cover other high-profile areas 
such as industrial relations almost as a matter of course.  It was before the era of 
specialisation, which did not dawn until the early 1960s, and indeed before political 
coverage as such began to account for a substantial proportion of the overall content of 
newpapers.  Full-time or part-time political correspondents like Michael McInerney of 
the Irish Times, Arthur Noonan of the Irish Independent (and later of RTE) and Jim 
McGuinness and Brendan Malin of the Irish Press (later succeeded by Michael Mills) 
saw many governments come and go, and watched the transition from the de Valera to 
the Lemass era with a generally benign, almost in some cases avuncular, mien. 
 
Not only was turnover low:  the personnel were few.  Mills, for example, would do 
double duty as political correspondent for the Irish Press and the Evening Press, using 
different by-lines;  the same would have been true for the Irish Independent and the 
Evening Herald.   
 
The political news - as opposed to features - content of the Sunday newspapers was scant 
enough, and frequently supplied by the same journalists who worked for the daily papers 
in the group concerned.  There was only one broadcasting station.  All in all, the lobby 
consisted of a small, tightly knit group of people, amounting to no more than half a dozen 
or so.  This was in marked contrast to the press gallery - the assembly of reporters who 
watched and recorded the proceedings of the Dail and Seanad - which would have 
comprised task forces of up to three reporters from each newspaper or media group.  In 
such circumstances, political control of the lobby was hardly an issue, and the esprit de 
corps was strong. 
 
Throughout this period, the actual organisation of the lobby was haphazard and reactive, 
rather than planed or programmed.  There were no regualr briefings.  The job of the head 
of the Government Information Bureau was to provide answers from the civil service or 
from ministers to queries from political correspondents.  Political "exclusives" were rare.  
Personality politics were almost non-existent.  In 1961, with the arrival of television, the 
number of people who were entitled to join, or wanted to join, the lobby rose, and this 
resulted in the provision of a special room in Leinster House in which the political 
correspondents all had their desks and telephones.  This development, positive in itself 
from the lobby's point of view, had one inescapable consequence:  it was possible, under 
these circumstances, for every political correspondent to overhear each of his colleague's 
telephone conversations, so that competitive journalism became even more of a rarity.  If 
any journalist left the room in search of an exclusive or private information, the chances 
were that he would be rigorously interrogated by his colleagues on his return for fear that 
he was about to upstage them all in the following morning's newspaper.  It was, perhaps 
to an even greater degree than its UK counterpart, an arrangement closely resembling a 
cartel. 
 
It was a dynamic which was if anything reinforced by one seminal event:  the journey to 
Japan by Jack Lynch, then Taoiseach, to launch a new tanker for the mammoth Gulf Oil 
company, which was in the process of establishing a major oil terminal in Bantry, Co. 
Cork.  Lynch was accompanied on this trip, which involved stopovers at a number of 
important points in the US and Australia, by the core group of political journalists of the 
era, and established relationships with them which were to be of considerable assistance 
to him and his administration in later years.  This particular tour was emblematic of 
another development;  the internationalisation of Irish politics which accompanied out 
entry to the EEC, as it then was.  This process involved the Taoiseach of the day in more 
frequent foreign travel, and the media 'pack' accompanying him, which was largely 
though not completely, co-extensive with the lobby, acquired a new sense of its own 
importance and value in the affairs of the nation.  This would be reflected, in turn, in an 
unwillingness to break ranks and a determination to respect confidences. 
 
Towards the end of the Lynch era, however, a number of factors were beginning to 
operate which would, in turn, begin to alter the role of the lobby itself.  One was the 
competitiveness between ministers, unknown (or at least successfully suppressed) during 
the de Valera era, and only in its infancy in the Lemass era.   
 
This competitiveness reached a high point when Lemass resigned and teams of ministers 
operated on behalf of the two principal contenders, Haughey and Colley, using the lobby 
as their primary target.  The new set of relationships which this engendered would have 
involved principally ministers such as Charles Haughey, Brian Lenihan, Donogh O' 
Malley and George Colley, each of whom would have seen himself as a potential 
successor to Lynch.  O' Malley, who died in 1968, was notable for his habit of spurning 
the private pleasures of the cabinet dining room, and joining the political correspondents 
for lunch in the communal restaurant in Leinster House. 
 
This degree of openness and more or less overt press manipulation and leaking by 
ministers downgraded the importance of the lobby as a channel for news and information.  
This process was if anything accelerated by the substitution of Eoin Neeson for O 
hAnnrachain in 1968.  Neeson, though an able journalist and historian himself, never 
managed to win the confidence of the lobby:  "no comment" became the standard 
response to many queries.  In fairness to Neeson, it may be that he lacked the authority, 
within the system as it then existed, to bend a rather traditional and secrecy-obsessed 
public service to the increasingly pressing demands of the media. 
 
This low point in the development of the lobby, and its usefulness to government, was 
marked in particular by the defeat of Fianna Fail in the 1973 election.  Lynch, 
increasingly media-conscious, hired Frank Dunlop, then an RTE journalist working for 
RTE in Belfast, as a press officer for the party in oposition.  Simultaneously, the new 
government - the first non-Fianna Fail administration for 16 years - was also taking stock.  
It transferred responsibility for government media relations to the new Minister for Posts 
and Telegraphs, Conor Cruise O' Brien, and drafted in an exceptionally able young 
television producer, Muiris MacConghail, to act as the new head of a re-structured 
government information service. 
 
The structural changes were significant.  MacConghail was given the rank of assistant 
secretary within the public service:  this gave him the right to obtain information from 
other government departments at a senior level.  He was also allowed to attend some 
cabinet meetings.  There were regular, non-attributable briefings by MacConghail and by 
individual ministers, although the Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, who was publicity-shy, was 
conspicuous generally by his absence from these proceedings.  The lobby responded 
positively to this acknowledgment of its status:  on one occasion at least, a non-
attributable briefing by a plainly distraught (and I do not mean this as a euphemism for 
drunken) Minister was not communicated to the public in any form because there was no 
way of doing so which would not have exposed the minister concerned to major, and 
unwelcome, political consequences.  When MacConghail resigned in 1975 he was 
succeeded by a broadcast journalist, Ted Nealon, whose relationship with the lobby until 
the end of that government in 1977 was on the whole amiable and well-tempered, 
although there were occasions when the journalists, sniffing a disagreement between the 
government partners, were visibly miffed by the spokesman's emollient approach. 
 When Lynch came back to power in 1977, Dunlop took over from Nealon:  in 1978 he 
became the first person in the particular job to adopt the title of Government Press 
Secretary.  The new title spoke of a new way of doing things, and of an increasingly 
political use, by the government, of the channels of information at its disposal. The 
relationship between Dunlop and Lynch's successor in 1979, Charles Haughey, was 
however, not close, although Dunlop remained in that role until the Fianna Fail defeat of 
1982, eventually leaving the civil service in 1986. 
 
Changes taking place within the government press service and its relationships with the 
lobby were accompanied by changes within the lobby itself.  For one thing, it was 
growing in size.  Jobs which had been shared between different papers were being 
divided;  new titles were being started up;  politics was bulking ever larger on the news 
agenda, especially with the election of Haughey, always a controversial figure.  A key 
date is 1980:  this is the year in which Geraldine Kennedy, a young journalist from 
Waterford who had previously worked on the Munster Express, the Cork Examiner and 
the Irish Times, joined the newly-founded Sunday Tribune as its political correspondent 
(Mary O' Malley, ‘Geraldine Kennedy, Political Correspondent with the Irish Times’, 
unpublished essay, M.Sc in Science Communication, Dublin City University, 1999).  In 
1982 she was to join the Sunday Press.  Although its significance can perhaps be 
exaggerated, it is least noteworthy that owing to pressure on space, Geraldine Kennedy 
was allocated her own room in a separate building, although she attended briefings by 
government spokesmen in the main building in the normal way.  One way or another, the 
fierceness of her appetite for political news, especially exclusive news, upped the ante 
considerably for her colleagues:  within government, the reaction, although unknown to 
most outsiders at the time - was even more marked.  Alarmed and dismayed at the 
apparently limitless channels of information flowing between Mr. Haughey's opponents 
in the Fianna Fail party and Ms. Kennedy, the Haughey administration even had her 
telephone illegally tapped. 
 
Although she would probably disclaim any major role in what happened subsequently, 
Kennedy's appointment marked the beginning of a new era.  She was to be joined in the 
political correspondents group by other formidable women journalists such as Una 
Claffey and Emily O' Reilly:  the former cartel became infected by a new spirit of 
competitiveness and adventure, as government spokespersons learned, sometimes to their 
cost.  Increasingly, unsatisfactory briefings were greeted with a chorus of disapproval or 
even derision.  Hapless spokespersons were sent back, with their tails between their legs, 
to get answers from ministers to supplementary questions.  On more than one occasion, 
some of them were seen to be close to tears.  In the mid-eighties, this renewed, and more 
muscular, sense of professional solidarity led to the more formal creation of the Political 
Correspondents' Group, of which Donal Kelly of RTE and Chris Glennon of the Irish 
Independent became - and remain - joint chairmen.  To become a member of this group, 
the applicant must show that he or she is a full time journalist working exclusively on 
politics and for a national medium (Edward Power, ‘The Political Lobby System’, 
seminar paper, MA in Journalism, Dublin City University, 1997)).  Applications for 
would-be members are decided on by a vote of the Group as a whole, on the grounds that 
only those who genuinely need this level of access should be granted it.  It negotiates 
with the Ceann Comhairle of the day about office space and other issues affecting the 
working practices of its members, and now has increased substantially in size. 
 
The 1982-87 coalition government period also saw the development of a different set of 
strains in relationships between government and the lobby.  These strains were caused not 
by a conflict of personalities within government, but by political strains between that 
government's component parties.  Such strains have been a feature of most coalition 
governments since that date, leading to the creation of a bifurcated, or trifurcated 
government information system in which the lobby is briefed independently (and 
sometimes, when there is conflict, differently) by spokesman for each of the 
government's component parties.  This, it need hardly be added, is substantially different 
from the UK system.  It has been in evidence during the recent series of tensions between 
the PDs and Fianna Fail;  but the most public manifestation was probably during the row 
about the publication of the Hamilton report on the Beef Tribunal, as Sean Duignan's 
diary explains graphically:  "4 October 1994.  Albert begins writing, in his spidery 
scrawl, a statement for me to feed out refuting the Labour briefings or as he puts it, 
'setting the record straight on Labour disinformation'.  He denies trying to railroad Harry 
through cabinet, points to 'unrelenting briefings from certain quarters' and insists the 
matter must be 'resolved' as soon as possible.  I tell him that Labour will see this as 
provocation on the eve of the first meeting between Spring and him for almost a month.  
Labour duly jump up and down....." (Sean Duignan, One Spin On The Merry-Go-Round, 
Dublin, Blackwater Press, 199X, 132). 
 
These developments also underlined the increasing politicisation of the role of 
Government Press Secretary, dating as far back as the early 1980s.  In 1984 Haughey, 
then leader of the Opposition, took the unusual step of accusing the then incumbent, Peter 
Prendergast, of news management and vilification.  That government, in turn, recognised 
the implicitly political dimension of the post by changing the rules so that all government 
press secretaries became, henceforth, not permanent but temporary civil servants, and had 
to resign their positions at the succeeding general election.  Another innovation, dating 
from 1983, was the creation of a separate, sub-lobby system for the correspondents in 
Dublin of foreign media.   
 
The lobby, it must be emphasised, was used at least as much for opposition/media 
relationships as for government/media relationships.  The then leader of the opposition, 
Mr. Haughey, by now had a new press spokesman, P.J. Mara, whose relationships with 
the lobby have been detailed to some extent in his biography (Tim Ryan, Mara PJ’, 
Dublin, Blackwater Press, 1992).  Haughey's ever growing unpopularity with the media, 
commented on publicly by Mara in later years, spawned a tension which Mara's 
considerable gifts were stretched to dispel.  At times, the sense of humour which he 
generally employed to good effect in this cause became a weapon used against him.  On 
one occasion, it became the core of a controversy in which, for the first time, Mara was 
positively identified as the source of a particular statement to the lobby.  This was on the 
occasion when, during growing internal criticism within Fianna Fail of Haughey's 
leadership, Mara quoted Mussolini's famous phrase:  "uno duce, una voce".  The 
journalist who decided to reveal him  
as the source of this remark was Geraldine Kennedy, then the Sunday Press, who argued 
later that she had not broken any of the conventions, and was within her rights as 
identifying Mara, as he could see that she had her notebook out and therefore - she 
presumed - accepted that what he was saying was on the record (O’Malley, ‘Kennedy’ , 
p. 4). The temptation to print his name in any case must have become well-nigh 
irresistable as Mara, in the course of delivering this remark, put a finger across his upper 
lip and goose-stepped up and down the room. 
 
In 1987 saw the return of a Fianna Fail minority government and the appointment of P.J. 
Mara as Government Press Secretary.  (Parenthetically, it also saw the election of 
Geraldine Kennedy as PD Deputy for the Dun Laoghaire constituency, until she lost her 
seat two years later).  Mara's relationships with the lobby were on the whole good, 
although he had a difficult job to do on behalf of his principal employer.  At Haughey's 
final press conference in 1992, Mara remarked, in self-defence, that he had never told a 
lie to journalists on Haughey's behalf.  Haughey's response was swift and, in the 
circumstances, more than consciously ironic:  "What was I paying you all that money for 
then?" 
 
Another, less commented upon feature of the operation of the lobby system at this time, 
however - and one which I suspect also differentiates it from the UK system - is that it 
became, unwittingly, part of a two-way information system.  Mara was legendary for 
never committing anything to paper himself:  his art was entirely verbal.  But as far as 
information was concerned, he became as much hunter-gatherer as provider.  As often as 
not, he would be sent down to the lion's den, not to put a spin on any particular 
government announcement or to give a briefing on future plans, but, in his employer’s 
words, to "find out what the fuckers are talking about".  An increasingly embattled 
Haughey needed information the way plants need water - information about the mood of 
the media, information about the moves being made by his opponents within the party, 
information about public concerns generally and, in this situation, the equation became 
not only one of an exchange of information for confidentiality, but an exchange of 
information for information.  This trend continued under successive governments.  As 
one former Government Press Secretary put it:  "There's a myth about politics that some 
political parties are media driven, and others are policy driven.  We all like to think that 
we belong in the latter category, but the truth is that every party wants to pursue a policy 
line - but also wants to know how the media will react to it.  The media, and especially 
the print media, think that they form opinion but they form opinion first within political 
parties, who regard them as the most critical sounding board" (Fergus Finlay, Snakes and 
Ladders, Dublin, New Island Books, 137) 
 
The lobby in the nineties has, therefore, undergone a number of sea-changes which 
reflect Irish circumstances, and which differentiate itself in at least some respects from its 
Westminster counterpart.  The most obvious difference is that it appears to be more 
aggressive, and less respectful, than the Werstminster lobby. In one recent account, there 
are frequent and loud echoes of the complaints by political journalists about the extent to 
which they were manipulated by Peter Mandelson, who was leaking information on 
behalf of Tony Blair in the run-up to the Labour leadership election (Paul Routledge, 
Mandy: The Unauthorized Biography of Peter Mandelson, London, Simon and Schuster, 
1999 154-82).  The journalists concerned are so incensed that they fail, perhaps, to realise 
that their complaints about the effectiveness of Mandelson's press management tactics 
also amount to an admission of their own ineptness and suggestibility. 
 
The agressiveness of the Irish lobby was, according to a number of journalists to whom I 
have spoken, particularly in evidence during the many briefings which preceded and 
accompanied the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, and for 
which the Irish and UK lobby systems were, effectively, conjoined.  According to these 
accounts, the spirit of lese majeste on the part of the Irish lobby occasioned more than a 
little comment among their UK counterparts:  the breezy way in which Irish political 
journalists tackled UK, as well as their own politicians and spokesmen spoke of the 
emergence of a different tradition on this side of the Irish sea.  I would not want to over-
state the case, but it is at least arguable. It also seems to be the case that other democratic 
assemblies on these islands, free to a greater or lesser extent from Westminster tutelage, 
are in the process of establishing more open, and less exclusive pathwats of 
communication between politicians and media. The new Scottish parliament 
(Consultative Steering Group of the Scottish Parliament, ‘Shaping Scitland’s Parliament’, 
Edinburgh, The Scottish Office, 1999) sets out the principles under which journalists 
covering the new parliament work: there is no resitricted lobby as such, and all bona-fide 
journalists are welcome on equal terms. Similar changes are taking place in the Welsh 
Assembnly, whose ministers have even taken a decision to publish Cabinet minutes 
(subject to certain excisions) after a six-week delay (Geraint Talfan Davies, Not By Bread 
Alone: Information, Media and the National; Assembly, Wales Media Forum, Cardiff, 
1999).  
 
This aggressiveness among the Leinster House press corps is partly a function of the Irish 
lobby's increased size:  over the years, the numerical balance between the two groups of 
reporters within parliament has swung markedly. New techhnology has reduced the need 
for the press gallery reporters to be physically present in the chamber, as has the wide 
availability of parliamentary proceedings on the Opireachtas website. This in return has 
reduced the importance of the parliamentary reporter.  The lobby, however, which reports 
the briefings, has probably now reached critical mass, with a membership approaching 
two dozen.  It is still tiny when compared to the UK lobby, which now numbers some 
150 journalists:  but perhaps, in the latter case, obesity is the problem. 
 
The existence of a large and permanently hungry corps of political correspondents 
increases the need for a flow of information from government - it is hardly a coincidence 
that the regular five p.m. briefings are colloquially referred to as "the feed" - and 
paradoxically, reduces the likelihood of politically exclusive stories emerging from this 
group of journalists. 
 
This in turn has had two effects.  The first is that political journalists in search of 
exclusives now know that they hope for them in vain from within the lobby system:  they 
have to hunt for them elsewhere.  This naturally tends to diminish the importance of the 
lobby as an institution in the sense that it operates on an increasingly routinised basis, in 
which insider status no longer confers proportionately privileged access to high-grade 
information. 
 
The second, perhaps in the end more significant, is that the role of the lobby as part of a 
government's news management system has, if anything diminished.  There is a visibly 
altering government set of media priorities, with television and the main evening news 
bulletin at the top of every politician’s list.  The existing lobby system cannot always 
deliver the desired level and type of publicity at this level, because the briefings are non-
discriminatory as between a large group of media people.  In these circumstances, the 
lobby can find itself frequently, if subtly, downgraded by a sophisticated use of the 
sound-bite system in which some journalists become, in George Orwell's words, more 
equal than others, granted an access that is even more privileged than that accorded to 
other members of the political correspondents' group because they have high profile roles 
in particular media. 
 
The paradox, therefore, is that the lobby is becoming of lesser importance in the overall 
spectrum of government/media relationships (although it was used to considerable effect 
during the Sheedy affair) precisely because it has grown in size.   
 
One the other hand, the very same development - the lobby's growth in size - has 
contributed to a much greater competitiveness among political journalists which will in 
the future, with luck, result in better political journalism for the benefit of the public. 
 
There is one final point which I would make in passing and it relates to technology.  The 
mechanics of the lobby system are essentially those of the nineteenth century:  a group of 
reporters, a government minister or spokesman, a document of press release.  
Increasingly, political news is now being made in the open, on the run.  And there are 
many sets of circumstances in which, despite all the resources at their command, political 
figures may be less well informed than their questioners.  No politician giving a press 
conference, however well briefed, can expect not to be faced, towards the end of the 
conference, by an unexpected question from a reporter who has received additional 
information on his mobile phone during the press conference itself - information which 
may not be available to the politician.  This is a trend which may in time alter, not just the 
modalities of the lobby system, but the modalities of political journalism itself. 
